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## Iraq's Exiled Shia Dissidents

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A Research Paper

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# **Iraq's Exiled Shia Dissidents**

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**A Research Paper**

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Comments and queries are welcome and may be  
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## Iraq's Exiled Shia Dissidents

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**Summary**

*Information available  
as of 3 June 1985  
was used in this report.*

Exiled Iraqi Shia dissidents remain a source of concern to Baghdad, but they pose little threat to Iraq's stability. Baghdad's ruthless and effective security services have arrested or deported most Shia activists and intimidated the remainder. Iran's efforts to unify dissident factions in exile into an effective force have left them weakened and more divided than ever. They have largely resisted Tehran's attempts at domination and are splintered by ideological, leadership, and strategic issues.

Tehran's greater interest in making the Iraqi Shias subservient than in building an effective anti-Baghdad movement presents the dissidents with a difficult choice. The acceptance of Iranian control gains them a nearby base of operations, arms, and financial support, but it weakens their appeal to Arab Shias in Iraq, many of whom harbor deep-rooted resentment toward Iran. Independent Iraqi Shia dissident groups, on the other hand, must locate their organizations far from Iraq and are too weak to capitalize on their greater potential appeal.

These divisions are reflected in the rivalries evident in Tehran's umbrella organization of Shia and Kurdish dissidents—the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. It is composed of elements of the Dawa Party, the Islamic Action Organization, the Iraqi Mujahidin, Kurdish nationalists, and smaller groups. Moderate factions of Dawa and the London-based Rabitat Ahl al-Bayt, on the other hand, remain largely outside the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq.

Syria probably has agreed to closer cooperation with Iraqi Shia dissidents and may give them military aid, training, and support for cross-border operations into Iraq.

The Shia dissident movement has limited appeal in Iraq. Most Iraqi Shias of Arab origin back efforts to prevent an Iranian invasion and view the Tehran-backed opposition groups as pawns of Iran.

Radical Iraqi Shia opposition elements will continue to engage in terrorism against the United States, the West, and Arab moderates. Stymied at the battlefield, Iran may direct those Iraqi Shia groups it controls to begin attacking foreigners, including Americans, to reduce outside support for the Baghdad regime.

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**Iraq's Exiled Shia Dissidents**

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The success of Islamic fundamentalists in overthrowing the Shah of Iran in 1979 emboldened some Iraqi Shias to organize to oust the secular Ba'thist regime of Saddam Husayn in Baghdad. Dissidents formed clandestine cells, tapping the disgruntlement of Iraq's disadvantaged Shias, who make up over half the population but do not share proportionately in political power or economic benefits. By 1980, Shia activists were mounting terrorist attacks against the regime, including the attempted assassination of Iraq's Foreign Minister. [REDACTED]

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The ruling Ba'th Party responded in tough fashion by deporting over 60,000 Shias of Iranian origin and arresting and executing dissident leaders, including Iraq's most respected Shia clergyman, Muhammad Baqr Sadr. The success of Baghdad's efforts is reflected in the virtual absence of significant Shia-conducted terrorist operations in Baghdad since then, according to the US Embassy in Baghdad. [REDACTED]

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Although largely crippled inside Iraq, the dissidents remain active in exile and have gained considerable organizational and financial help from Iran and, to a lesser extent, Syria. Iran has sought to forge the Iraqi oppositionists into a single body that would conduct terrorist and guerrilla activities inside Iraq and help assure Iranian domination of Iraq after the defeat of the Ba'thists. So far, Iran's efforts have met with little success. [REDACTED]

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**Creating an Umbrella for Iraqi Shia Dissidents**

The Iranians created the 40-member Tehran-based Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI) in 1982 as an umbrella organization for most Iraqi Shia and Kurdish dissidents.<sup>2</sup> It was designed to coordinate their activities and ensure Iranian influence over them. Iran is disappointed by the ineffectiveness of the organization, however, [REDACTED]

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**Principal Iraqi Shia Dissident Organizations****Pro-Iranian or Leaning  
Toward Iran****Independents**

*Supreme Assembly of the  
Islamic Revolution in  
Iraq (SAIRI)*

*Dawa (The Islamic Call  
Party)*

*The Iraqi Mujahidin  
(The Iraqi Fighters)*

*Rabitat Ahl al-Bayt  
(League of the Descen-  
dants of the Prophet)*

*Islamic Action  
Organization*

*Al-Fatah al-Islami  
Movement (The Islamic  
Conquest Movement)*

*Jund al-Imam (Soldiers  
of the Imam)*

*The Iraqi Hizballah  
(Party of God)*

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**Shia Weaknesses**

Tehran's efforts to make the Iraqi Shia opposition subservient to Iranian concepts and control are partly to blame for the fact that they are divided and weak. According to the US Embassy in Baghdad, many Iraqi Shia dissidents oppose Iran's concept of *velayat-e faqih*, which holds that Ayatollah Khomeini is the supreme guide of all Shias, including those in Iraq. Others resist Tehran's attempts to control their activities. [REDACTED]

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The dissident movement is further weakened by its factionalized support base in Iraq. [REDACTED]

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Shia religious leaders in Iraq have misgivings about Iran as well. US diplomats in Baghdad report that, even though many of these leaders desire the overthrow of President Saddam Husayn, they are concerned that his ouster would bring an influx of Iranians into Iraqi cities that house some of Shia Islam's most revered shrines. They also are worried that Iranian religious leaders would demand precedence over their Iraqi counterparts. [REDACTED]

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**Iran's Puppets**

25X1 [redacted] the  
 25X1 Iranians are trying to form new mass movements  
 25X1 among Iraqi Shia exiles in Iran to supplant the older  
 25X1 groups, such as Dawa, that are resisting Iranian  
 25X1 dominance. [redacted] they have  
 25X1 created several organizations, including the Iraqi Mu-  
 25X1 jahidin, Hizballah, and Jund al-Imam (Soldiers of the  
 25X1 Imam) in the hope that they will gain popular support  
 25X1 in Iraq for an Islamic republic on Iranian lines. [redacted]  
 [redacted]

25X1 The Mujahidin is SAIRI's primary military wing.  
 25X1 The Mujahidin, headed by Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim,  
 25X1 and the Iraqi Hizballah Party, headed by Sadri  
 25X1 Qobbanchi, are composed at least in part of Iraqi  
 25X1 prisoners of war and expelled Iraqi refugees of Iranian  
 25X1 origin. [redacted]  
 [redacted]

25X1 We believe that members of these organizations num-  
 25X1 ber at most only a few thousand. The Jund al-Imam,  
 25X1 headed by Abdullah Shirazi, is another small group  
 25X1 that is in the Iranian camp, [redacted]  
 [redacted]

25X1 Increased Syrian support for the Mujahidin will  
 25X1 enhance its terrorist capability inside Iraq, but such  
 25X1 activity will remain little more than an irritant to  
 25X1 Baghdad. Mujahidin leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim  
 25X1 headed a delegation that met with Syrian President  
 25X1 Hafiz al-Assad in February, according to the US  
 25X1 Embassy in Damascus. The visit received prominent  
 25X1 coverage in Syria's press, and we believe that Damas-  
 25X1 cus agreed to closer cooperation with Iraqi Shia  
 25X1 dissidents and may give them military aid, training,  
 25X1 and support for cross-border operations into Iraq.  
 25X1 Such action is consistent with other Syrian efforts to  
 25X1 weaken the Baghdad regime such as increased mili-  
 25X1 tary support for Iraqi Kurdish rebels. [redacted]

25X1 The Iranians have considerable control over the Is-  
 25X1 lamic Action Organization as well. The IAO, an  
 25X1 offshoot and rival of Dawa, is headed by Muhammad  
 25X1 Taqi al-Modarasi, an Iranian cleric. The IAO has  
 25X1 conducted terrorist operations inside and outside Iraq,  
 25X1 but we know of none that has been directed at US  
 25X1 interests. [redacted]

**The Primary Opponents of Iranian Domination**  
**Dawa.** Dawa, the Islamic Call Party, is the oldest,  
 largest, and most prestigious Iraqi Shia dissident  
 group. Dawa's moderate majority faction has sharp  
 ideological differences with Iran. [redacted]

Dawa is also highly factionalized. [redacted]

Tehran has tried to undercut the influence of Dawa's  
 moderate leadership. [redacted]

**Rabitat Ahl al-Bayt.** Rabitat Ahl al-Bayt, the League  
 of the Descendants of the Prophet, is another Shia  
 group reluctant to accept orders from Tehran. It is  
 based in London and brings together factions from  
 SAIRI, Dawa, and other groups not resident in Iran.  
 Its leader, Mahdi al-Hakim, elder brother of SAIRI's  
 leader, Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim, was formerly  
 closely identified with Dawa. [redacted]

[redacted] Mahdi failed  
 in his bid to gain substantial support from Ayatollah  
 Khomeini in 1981, probably because he refused to

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accept Iranian domination. [REDACTED]

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We believe that Rabitat Ahl al-Bayt's independence from Iran gives it more potential appeal in Iraq than rival organizations headquartered in Tehran. We have no confirmation, however, of its effectiveness inside Iraq and no estimates of its size. [REDACTED]

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**Prospects**

The Iraqi dissidents pose no immediate threat to the Baghdad regime, and we see little chance of an effective Shia dissident movement emerging from the badly splintered rebels. The differences between the groups are too numerous and wide to be easily bridged. The emergence of a native Iraqi Shia leader with widespread popular support among Iraq's Shias would improve the rebels' prospects, but no candidate with the necessary appeal is on the horizon. Even if one were to emerge, Iran probably would view him as a challenge and undermine his influence. [REDACTED]

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### *Developments That Would Improve Exiled Shias' Prospects*

*The fortunes of Iraqi Shia dissidents would rise under the following conditions:*

- *The removal of Iraqi President Saddam Husayn or other events that fuel rivalries within the ruling Ba'th Party.*
  - *A significant upsurge in fighting by Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq that diverts the attention of Iraqi security services.*
  - *Drastic Iraqi Government austerity measures necessitated by the war that create resentment toward the regime.*
  - *Major Iraqi military setbacks that embolden some Iraqi Shias to engage in antiregime activity and lead others to hedge their bets by becoming less anti-Iranian.*
  - *The emergence of a powerful Iraqi Shia dissident leader with widespread appeal in Iraq.*
  - *A shift in Iranian policy that encourages the independence of Iraqi dissidents.*
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Iraqi Shia dissident leaders who accept Iranian control gain a secure base of operations, financial and logistic support, and weapons. They pay a price for such support, however, because we believe their reputations are tarnished among Iraq's Arab Shias, who harbor deep-seated resentment toward Iran. This animosity stems from repeated wars and national rivalries for regional influence. Independent leaders, on the other hand, keep their reputations intact but lack the practical support that their rivals enjoy.

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Bogged down in a stalemated ground war, Iran will be tempted to direct the Iraqi Shia dissident groups that it controls to conduct terrorist operations against foreigners, including US citizens, in Iraq. The Iranians doubtless were encouraged by the departure of many dependents of diplomats and foreign contractors from Iraq during the recent Iranian Scud missile attacks. Terrorist attacks would have a similar impact in weakening foreign support for the Iraqi regime as well as its economy.

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As the bombing of the US Embassy in Kuwait demonstrates, Iraqi Shia dissidents have the assets to strike outside Iraq. Large indigenous and Iranian-origin Shia populations and proximity to Iran make the Persian Gulf the most likely location for such

attacks. Iran might order terrorist attacks against US, other Western, and Arab moderates' interests there, particularly if it believed its military situation was desperate. Despite the fact that Dawa moderates give primacy to political action over terrorism, radical Shias are prepared to engage in such acts either on their own or as Iran's surrogates. Although divisions have weakened the dissident movement and reduced its troublemaking potential, Iraq's Shia opposition will possess a terrorist card that they can play for years to come.

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